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TO THE CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR.
OF INTEREST RATES
A. Applications of the Lutz-Meiselman Model
IF BOTH liquidity effects and incorrect expectations are disregarded,
one should expect to find that long-term rates are higher than
short-term rates when the latter are low and lower than short-term
rates when the latter are high; in the absence of trends in interest
rates, the average yields of short- and long-term rates should be
equal. Insofar as short-term rates are relatively low about cyclical
troughs and high about peaks, yield curves ought to be negatively
sloped at peaks and positively sloped at troughs. Peaks and troughs
in specific cycles of short-term rates should be anticipated by move-
ments in long-term rates. If the market anticipates increases or de-
creases in short-term rates, long-term rates should move in advance
in the same direction. Hence, if .peaks and troughs in short-term
rates are coincident with the reference cycle, peaks and troughs in
long-term rates ought to lead the business cycle, and the lo:nger the
maturity, the greater the lead. The reasoning here is the same as
that which led Macaulay to expect time money rates to lead call
money rates.
Analytically, the 91-day bill rate can be regarded as a spot or
instantaneous rate of interest which reflects money market condi-
Lions at specific phases of the cycle. In contrast, the yield on long-
term governments represents an average of the current and expected
spot rates over the course of three or four reference cycles. Because82 Liquidity Preference and Expectations Applied
the term to maturity of long-term governments is longer than the
usual reference cycle, the yields of these securities reflect an average
of spot rates during both expansions and contractions. Hence, long-
term rates vary relatively less than short-term rates. Money market
conditions during a specific phase of a cycle are largely "averaged
out" (the effects of abnormally low or high spot rates largely cancel)
in the determination of the long-term rate. In contrast, money
market conditions during specific cycle phases are completely re-
flected in bill yields. As a result, short-term rates ought to be more
variable over the cycle than long-term rates. The expectations
hypothesis implies that the shorter the term to maturity of a secur-
ity, the smaller the number of spot rates that are averaged in order
to determine its yield; consequently, the larger its variance over
the cycle. Cyclical movements in the short- relative to the long-
term rate can be analyzed as if the latter were a permanent or
normal rate of interest and the short-term rate contained a large
transitory component. This transitory component is largest about
peaks and troughs. When positive, at peaks, short-term rates are
high relative to long-term rates; when negative, at troughs, short-
term rates are relatively low.1
The market regards current short-term rates as abnormally high
when they are above long-term rates, and expects them to fall in
the future. At such times, holders of long-term securities expect
1Thisimplies that the correlation between a moving average of short-term
rates and long-term rates over the cycle would be greater than the correlation
between current short. with long-term rates. A moving average would abstract
from cyclical effects on short-term rates; it would depict permanent short-term
rates and abstract from transitory effects. It also would, of course, reduce the
amplitude of the fluctuations in short- relative to long-term rates; in effect, it
converts short- to long-term rates.
The view that the long-term rate is an average of short-term rates explains
why Hicks found that time series of short- and long-term rates were less strongly
correlated than averages of past and present short-term rates (both weighted and
unweighted) andlong.term rates. Presumably averages reflect expectations of
"permanent" short-term rates. Hence they are more like long-term rates than
actual short-term rates which embody a transitory component that is negative
at troughs and positive at peaks. See Hicks, "Mr. Hawtrey On Bank Rates,"
p. 28. Hawtrey's position is similar to that of Charles C. Abbott, "A Note on
the Government Bond Market," The Review of Economic Statistics, Vol. 17, 1935,
p. 9. Both reasoned that the forces that affect short maturity yields are largely
independent of the forces that affect long maturity yields because fluctuations
in short-term rates are much greater than those in long-term rates,to Cyclical Behavior of Interest Rates 83
to win capital gains because the passage of time will eliminate
the abnormally high short-term rates from the average of present
and future short-term rates that is the long-term rate. The opposite
occurs when short-term rates are relatively low; i.e., the holders of
long-term securities expect to incur capital losses as low short-term
rates are eliminated from the average that is the long-term rate.
This does not, in itself, imply that it is more profitable to hold
long- than short-term securities when rates are expected to fall. If
the expectations of the market are correct, then the high yields of
short- relative to long-term securities would just offset expected
capital gains on the latter. The yield differential in this case repre-
sents what the market thinks is necessary to equalize the holding
period yields of these securities, taking into account both
and capital gains. Conversely, when short-term rates are abnormally
low, they are expected to rise. The abnormally large yield advan-
tage of long-term securities in this case represents what the market
thinks is necessary to offset the expected capital losses attributable
to holding them. Whether or not the holding period yields of short-
term relative to long-term securities are greater or less over the cycle
depends upon which way the market erred in predicting future
short-term rates. A fall in short-term rates that is larger than. antici-
pated favors the holders of long-term securities, and vice versa.
These implications of the expectations hypothesis for the cyclical
behavior of interest rates are in part incorrect because liquidity
preference is not an independent variable in the analysis. Yet they
go far towards providing an interpretation of the behavior of yield
differentials between long- and short-term governments since 1920.
In particular, they further our understanding of the sharp move-
ments in short-term rates that occurred during this time.
In the 1920's there were two periods when short-term rates were
above long-term rates (see Chart 7).During1920, and again in 1929,
the market anticipated lower future short-term rates. Although the
absolute level of short-term rates during 1920 was about severity-five
basis points higher than it was in 1929, the anticipated fall was much
greater in 1929. The yield advantage of short-term over long-term
securities in 1929 was at least twice as great as it was in 1921. The
fall in short-term rates from 1929 to 1931 was about 450 basis84 Liquidity Preference and Expectations Applied
points, whereas the fall from 1920 to 1922 was about 275 basis
points. Both downward movements were greater than the other
declines in short-term rates (turing this
In more recent years (1957 and 1959), short-term rates were again
higher than long-term rates(see Chart 6). The absolute level of
rates was higher in 1959 but the yield differential between long-
and short-term securities was about the same. The subsequent
downward movements in short-term rates were of roughly equal
magnitude, about 275 basis points, and were the largest declines
since the 1920's. In the 1930's, short-term relative to long-term rates
were especially low. This was a consequence of abnormally low
short-term rates; they were at historical lows.
The implications of a pure expectations model for the cyclical
behavior of interest rates are inconsistent with the following obser-
vations:(1) short maturities yield less over the cycle than long
maturities; yield curves are more often than not positively sloped;
(2) short-term rates fail to exceed long-term rates at peaks as much
as they fall below long-term rates at troughs; (3) the variance over
the cycle in yields of three-month Treasury bills is less than the
variance of nine- to twelve-month governments; (4) when short-term
rates are above long-term rates, it is not the shortest term to matur-
ity that bears the highest yield, i.e., yield curves at first rise with
term to maturity and then fall;(5) long-term rates fail to lead
turning points in short-term rates.
B. Applications of the Hicks Model
1. CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF GOVERNMENTS
To explain these observations, liquidity preference must be added
to the analysis. This implies that interest rates no longer measure
the total return derivedfrom holding securities. Securities also
yield a nonpecuniary or liquidity income to their holders. The
evidence presented indicates that the nonpecuniary return from
securities is inversely related to term to maturity and directly re-
lated to the level of pecuniary yields. The shorter the term to ma-
turity, the larger the fraction of the total return from a securityto Cyclical Behavior of Interest Rates 85
that is nonpecuniary, and vice versa. The higher the level of interest
rates, the wider the spread between the total return from a security
and its pecuniary yield, and vice versa.
if, abstracting from differences in expectations of future short-
term rates, the total return attributable to all maturities is the same,
i.e., the sum of pecuniary and nonpecuniary returns is equal for
all terms to maturity, then the pecuniary yield must be an increas-








"Normal" or Average Yield Curve
Years to maturity
random effect on yield curves, the average yield curve will be posi-
tively sloped, and short-term rates will, on the average, be lower
than long-term rates. The interaction of expectations and liquidity
preference to produce a "normal" yield curve is shown in Chart 14.
The "total return" curve is flat; it depicts a market in which future
short-term rates are expected to be the same as the curren.t rates.
The liquidity yield is the fraction of total yields for any given
maturity that is nonpecuniary. Subtracting the nonpecuniary corn-
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ponent from total return leaves the pecuniary yield curve, which
is the yield curve observed in the market.2
Liquidity preference produces asymmetry in the relationship be-
tween short. and long-term rates at cycle peaks and troughs. It
accounts for the failure of short-term rates to exceed long-term













troughs, both liquidity and expectational forces oper-
ate independently to establish short-term rates below long-term rates.
Liquidity preference pt'ocluces a pecuniary yield differential of long-
term over short-term securities. At troughs,. the market regards
the current short-term rate as abnormally low and expects it to be
2Liquidityreturn as a percentage of total return was obtained by first fitting
a yield curve to average yields as a function of term to maturity for the three
latest reference cycles. Then the ratios of yields for particular maturities to
twenty-year government bond yields were computed. The difference between the
ratio for any given term to maturity and one constitutes the fraction of total
yield that is nonpecuniary for, that term to maturity.
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higher in the future. Hence, expectations also 1)Ush short-term
below long-term rates. Both effects operate to widen the spread
between these rates (Chart15).The total-return curve slopes
tively because the market expects future yields on short maturities,
both, pecuniary and nonpecuniary, to be higher than current short
maturity yields. Subtracting the liquidity component from the total
yield curve produces a market yield curve with a long-short differ-
CHART 16




— Liquidity premium —
8 10
Years to maturity
entialgreater than the iifferential for the corresponding total yield
curve.
At cyclical peaks, in contrast to cyclical troughs, liquidity and
expectationalforces produce oppositeeffectson yieldcurves.
Liquidity preference, as always, operates to Cs tablish short-term
below long-term rates. However, expectations act in the opposite
direction. Because the market expects future short-term rates to be
lower, the total yield curve declines as a function of term to matur-
ity. Whether or not the resulting market yield curve is rising, fall-
ing, or both depends upon the relative strength of these opposing88 Liquidity Preference and Expectations Applied
forces. Because these forces work in opposite directions at cyclical
peaks but in the same direction at troughs, short-term yields do not
exceed long-term yields at peaks as much as they fall below long-
term yields at troughs.
The foregoing analysis implies that flat market yield curves should
be interpreted as indicating that the market expects future pecun-
iary yields of short maturities to be lower than current short-term








Yield Curve at Cyclical Peaks
Years to maturity
return that is nonpecuniary for a forward rate which pertains to a
specific period of calendar time will rise with the passage of time.
Hence, its pecuniary yield will fall below current spot rates. A flat
market yield curve is shown in Chart 16. A falling total-return
curve is a necessary condition for its existence.
Charts 17 and 18 depict yield curves with segments that are
negatively sloped (yield curves with such shapes are also referred
to as humped). Such curves are produced by expectations of sharply
falling interest rates, i.e., interest rates that are falling more sharply
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10to Cyclical Behavior of Interest Rates 89
than those in Chart 15. The more sharply interest rates are expected
to fall, the shorter the term to maturity of the peak in yields; the
more gradual the expected fall, the further out on the yield curve
the peak will be. If the expectedfallshort-term rates is very
gradual, no negative segment appears. Yield curves with negative
segments have been relatively rare, at least since the 1920's; expec-
tations of interest-rate declines are usually not sharp enough to






Effects ofAlternative Expectations of Fallin.g Rales
upon the Shapes of Yield Curves
Years to maturity
Liquiditypreference also explains why the shortestterm to ma-
turity is not the highest yielding security in the term structure at
cyclical peaks. In order for a yield curve to exist that has the shortest
term to maturity bearing the highest yield, expectations of ex-
tremely sharp declines in short-term rates are required. Such ex-
pectations, while a theoretical possibility, did not exist during the
two most recent cyclical peaks and possibly have never existed.
The liquidity preference hypothesis implies that nonpecunial'y
Interest rates
5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10r
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yields are a decreasing function of term to maturity. Hence, the range
of pecuniary yields that will be observed in the market will increase
with term to maturity. For example, SUPI)OSC liquidity yields for
Treasury bills and nine- to twelve-month governments are at all times
50 and 25 per cent of total returns. Further, assume that total
returns, which are of course not directly observable in the market,
range from 4 to 8 per cent. Pecuniary yields will then range from 2
to 4 per cent for bills, and from 3 to 6 per cent for nine- to twelve-
month governments. Hence liquidity preference implies that the
variance in yields over the cycle increases with term to maturity.
The expectations hypothesis implies just the opposite: that the
shorter the term to maturity, the greater the variance. Therefore,
the actual variance observed in the market for any specified term to
maturity represents a composition of these conflicting forces. The
available evidence on variance as a function of term to maturity
suggests that liquidity effects dominate expectational effects for
governments with maturities equal to or less than nine-to-twelve
months. For three- to five-year governments and longer maturities,
expectational effects dominate. The absence of time series between
these maturity ranges precludes a precise estimate here of the bor-
derline separating the domains of dominance of expectations and
liquidity.
During expansions, yield differentials between Treasury bills
and nine- to twelve-month governments widen. Insofar as liquidity
effects dominate expectational effects, liquidity premiums ought to
widen from trough to peak since, according to the liquidity prefer-
ence hypothesis, they are an increasing function of the absolute
level of interest rates. Consequently, if only liquidity effects are at
work, the differentials between bills and nine- to twelve-month
governments would increase more than the increases observed. Add-
ing expectations to the analysis implies, given the assumption that
the market can recognize transitorily high oi' low levels of spot
rates, the addition of an opposing force. Converse implications are
implied for contractions. Liquidity operates to narrow, and expecta-
tions to widen, the spread between bills and nine- to twelve-month
governments. Since liquidity is dominant [or this maturity range,to Cyclical Behavior of Interest Rates 91
the observed spreads decrease during contractions. For evidence on
how these differentials have actually behaved, see Charts 5 and 6.
These findings for governments do not necessarily apply to corpo-
rates or to the issues of government agencies unless the nonpecuniary
component of total yield is the same. In general, governments ap-
pear to be more liquid, ignoring the influence of term to maturity,
than either agency issues or Among short-term secu-
rities, governments have a comparative liquidity advantage over
agencies or corporates. The bill market has very low transactions
costs and bid and asked prices are firm for extremely large trans-
actions. This suggests that when yield curves are humped, the peak
in yields will have a longer term to maturity for corporates than for
governments.
In the absence of liquidity premiums, and assuming the market
can forecast turning points in the specific cycles of interest rates,
cyclical peaks in long-term rates would precede those of short-term
rates and would be observable first. Similarly, troughs in long-term
rates would precede troughs in short-term rates. The rationale that
Macaulay used to argue that the seasonal peak in time money rates
should precede that in call money rates is relevant here. Insofar as
the market can predict turning points in short-term rates, the long-
term rate (which is an average of future short-term rates) should
reach its peak first in anticipation of the peak in short-term rates.
When liquidity preference is introduced into the analysis, how-
ever, the sequence in the timing of peaks and troughs of long- and
short-term securities becomes less obvious. If liquidity premiums
are a function of spot rates, then an amount is added to long-term
rates which increases as short-term rates increase and reaches a peak
when the latter reach their peak. The peak in long-term rates must
3Theevidence for the proposition that agency issues arcless liquid tlian
governments is of two kinds. (1) Agencies have higher transactions costs. The
spread between l)id and asked prices, as reported in dealer quotation sheets,
ranges from two-thirty-seconds for short-term securities to a whole point, the
equivalent of ten dollars, for long-term securities. (2) The value of agencies as
collateral for bankloansis poorer than itis for governments. Per dollar of l)OE-
rowing,the market value of collateral in the form of agencies, term to maturity
aside, is higher than it is for governments. The Joint Economic Committee Study
oftheDealerMarket,p. 95, reports that the margin requirements for agencies
are 5percent.92 Liquidity Preference and Expectations Applied
occur later, therefore, thanitwould have occurred in a world of
expectations.
How much later this peak will occur can only be partially dc-
termined by a priori reasoning. It is clear that the peak in long-
term rates should not occur after the peak in short-term rates. Since
the maximum amount that will be added to long-term rates be-
cause of liquidity preference will occur when short-term rates reach
their peak, the peak in long-term rates must either precede or be
synchronous with that of short-term rates.
Since the end of World War II, the behavior of time series of
governments with various terms to maturity indicates that all se-
curities, irrespective of maturity, reach their peaks and troughs
synchronously. Hence, without going further into the question of
whether liquidity premiums add enough to long-term rates to de-
lay their peaks until all peaks are synchronous, irrespective of term
to maturity, one cannot say, using this evidence alone, whether the
market can or cannot turning points in interest rates. In
view of the inability of the market to predict turning points of
other series, on balance, it seems reasonable to interpret these
findings as being consistent with the view that the market cannot
predict turning points in specific cycles of interest rates.4
2. CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF AGENCY ISSUES AND CORPORATES
The thesis has been advanced that liquidity premiums are caused
primarily by a desire to avoid the risk of capital loss. The evidence
indicates that yield differentials, when only liquidity differences
exist, increase with the absolute level of rates. The observations of
an upward trend in liquidity for the three latest cycles,
and regressions of liquidity premiums upon spot rates, show that
liquidity premiums increase when interest rates increase. This
thesis has implications for the cyclical and secular behavior of other
rates of interest. It implies that low-quality bonds ought to yield
4 The highest correlation (.98) of seasonally adjusted time series for three-month
Treasury bills with time- to twelve-month governments was obtained by assum-
ing the two series to be synchronous. The correlations with one-, two-, and
three-month leads and lags were: .95 for onemonth,.90 for two, and .83 for
three. No difference, to two decimal places, was observed for leads and lags of
equal duration.to Cyclical Behavior of Interest Rates 93
more, the cycle aside, than high-quality bonds because they are
relatively less liquid, i.e., price variance is greater as a result of the
greater default risk. Consequently, it should be possible to observe
that high-quality bonds yield less than low-quality bonds generally
and that the yield differential between high- and low-quality bonds in-
creases from trough to peak, and decreases from peak to trough.
By symmetrical reasoning, the spread between government agency
issues and governments, ignoring term to maturity, should increase
with the absolute level of interest rates.
To test one of these propositions, yield differentials between gov-
ernments and government agency issues were regressed against their
sums. The results of this test are mixed. For nine- to twelve-month
maturities, the spreads between governments on the one hand, and
Federal National Mortgage Association, Federal Land Bank, and
Federal Home Loan Bank issues on the other, are consistent with
the hypothesis advanced; spreads increase as the absolute level of
interest rates increase. The same is true for maturities ten years
and over. The best results were obtained by regressing the yield
differential between a government bond, the three and one-quarter
of 1983, and an index of AA utility yields of bonds with coupons
of three and one-eighth to three and three-eighths against their sum.
The correlation was positive and 40 per cent of the variation in the
spread was explained.5 However, for three- to five-year governments
and FLB and FNMA issues, the slopes of the regression coefficients
were negative, one significantly so.
The consequences of changes in the level of interest rates for
yield differentials between low- and high-quality bonds over the
cycle is somewhat more difficult to detect. During contractions, the
level of rates falls and the market usually increases its estimates of
the risks of default by the issuers of low-quality securities. Con-
versely, the level of rates rises during expansions and the market
usually decreases its estimates of the risks of default. Hence, ii-
5 All of the agency issues exhibited a signthcant downward trend over time in
yield differentials compared with governments. Presumably this reflects the diffu-
sion of knowledge about the investment merits of these securities that has oc-
curred in recent years. The data for the agencies consist of incomplete series,
mostly for the last decade, compiled by Charles E. Quincey and Co., and Allen
Knowles, the fiscal agent of the Federal Home Loan Banks. The AA utility series
is compiled by Salomon Bros. & Hutzler.94 LiquidityPreference and Expectations Applied
quidity and cyclical forces work in opposite directions upon yield
differentials. During the post-World War 11 period, the revaluation.
of risks over the cycle has dominated liquidity forces. Hence, the
yields of Baa Moody's bonds, for all categories, have fluctuated less
than corresponding Aaa bonds.
The behavior of low- and high-quality bond yielddifferentials
over time seems to support the view that the level of rates and
these differentials are related.Since1945,the spread between
Moody's AAA and BAA series has increased with the level of inter-
est rates. The regression of the difference on the sum indicates that
the difference rises with the level of rates.
Prewar investigations of the relationship between the yield differ-
ential of high- and low-grade bonds and the level of interest rates
also conforms to this finding.
Ratios of promised yields (or yield spreads) to the basic rates on high-
grade issues deserve more attention than they can be given in this report.
According to the classical theory of investment values, the simple yield
spread, or algebraic difference between the promised yield and basic rate,
would provide the best measure of the risk premium for issues properly
priced in the market, since the yield is conceived of as the algebraic sum
of the pure rate of interest and the risk premium. It is a matter of record,
however, that yield spreads frequently narrow when basic rates fall, and
widen when basic rates rise ..., perhapsbecause of the efforts of investors
to compensate for changes in basic rates.6
For any preassigned cyclical downturn in bill rates, yield differ-
entials between low- and high-grade bonds should decrease most
during severe and least during mild contractions. Conversely, dur-
ing strong upturns, the differential ought to increase more for sharp
than for mild recoveries. The data on the behavior of differentials
between low- and high-grade bonds, since the end of World War
II, while they support the view that there has been a secular rise
in the differential, do not support the view that the differential is
at a maximum at peaks and minimum at troughs. In fact, the
maximum differential seems to appear midway between the cyclical
peak and the trough. This seems to be accounted for by differences
6W.Braddock Hickman, CorporateBondQuality and Investor Experience,
Princeton University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1958, p.
288. For further discussion, see following pages.to Cyclical Behavior of Interest Rates 95
betweenlow- and high-grade bonds in the timing of their specific
cycle peaks and troughs. In the postwar period, specific cycle peaks
and troughs of high-grade bonds consistently preceded those of low-
grade bonds. Hence, the maximum yield differential between the
two could not have been associated with business cycle turning
points.7
Hickman's investigation of the relationship between low- and
high-grade bond yields over time suggests that the long-run rate of
return to investors in low-grade bonds is greater than itisfor
high-grade bonds. He concludes that "the highest returns were ob-
tairied by investors who could afford to take the greatest risks." 8 He
found that both the variance and the average rate of return was
greatest for investments in low-grade bonds. In this respect, his
finding is symmetrical with the relationship between long- and
short-term government yields, taking into account both capital gains
and interest receipts.
7 Part of the increase in the measured yield differential between low- and
high.grade bonds is attributable to differences between the economic, as distin-
guished from the temporal, term to maturity of these bonds. If calendar term
to maturity is the same for both grades, then economic term to maturity, which
Macaulay termed duration, must be shorter on the lower-grade issues. (See Move-
inenis of Interest Rates, Chapter II, for a discussion of this point.) The weights
assigned to receipts in the near, relative to the distant, future for computing
yield to maturity is greater for low- than high-quality bonds. Hence, a rise in
rates during aim expansion, with no change in investor attitudes towards risk,
will increase measured yield differentials for the same reason that yields of
three- to five-year governments rise relative to twenty-year governments during
an expansion. This same point explains why the market believes that if interest
rates are expected to fall, securities with equal yields and terms to maturity will
have different relative price rises if their coupons are not the same. The size of
the coupons will be inversely related to the rate of change of capital values.
In fact, this phenomenon seems to account for a trivial portion of the cyclical
variation in the yield differential between low- and high-quality bonds. To de-
termine the quantitative importance of this effect, a constant risk differential of
I per cent for all spot and forward rates was assumed for two hypothetical ten-
year bonds. At peaks, the higher-grade bond was, assumed to consist of a six-
month spot rate of 5 per cent, with the first forward rate being 4.5 per cent and
all succeeding forward rates, 4 per cent. At troughs, the higher-grade bond was
assumed to consist of a six-month spot rate of 2 per cent, with the firstfor-
ward rate being 3 per cent and all succeeding forward rates 4 per cent. The
yield to maturity of these two postulated securities differed by ninety-eight basis
points at troughs, and one hundred and two at peaks.
8 Hickman, Corporate Bond Quality, p. 138.